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I. Introduction
There is an old story about a drunken man who is looking for an
object under a street light. A policeman asks him what he is looking
for. "It is my keys", he says. "Did you lose them here?" "No, over
there.'" "Why then are you looking for them over here?" "Because
I can see here", is the man's reply.
The real significance of this story is very different from what it
appears. It is not the man who is foolish but the policeman. We
can only look for something from where we can see it. The alternative
is to burrow like moles in the dark. But how can we find something
that is not there? We can't of course, but we can get a perspective
of it by following a ray of light as far as it will go. There are many
lights and many perspectives, but no one absolute objective truth,
or any one way of finding it.
What has this story to do with the topic under discussion? I want
to make two main points with it. The first is that I hope it will
excuse the inadequacy of my knowledge and treatment of the topic.
This is the negative point; but there is also a positive one. We must
not look for the essence of anything, or view it in terms of the
conventionally established approach. There comes a point when this
approach is exhausted, when it has nothing left to offer us, and our
inquiry becomes self-defeating. The prevalent analytical approach to
jurisprudence is a case in point; it is the complement of the legal
positivism which it purports to analyse. The worst of it is not so
much the slant of its own perspective as the blotting out of alternatives.
By co-opting all "respectable" opposition, it becomes tyrannical.
Wittgenstein said: "A main cause of philosophical disease - a
one-side diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of
example."' Jurisprudence is supposed to study law in the round, from
a distance. This requires a varied diet, a consideration of its various
*Professor, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University.
(Editor's note: Professor Samek died July 1, 1984)
1. L. Wittgenstein, PhilosophicalInvestigations, transl. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford,
Blackwell, section 593.

197 The Dalhousie Law Journal

aspects, and overviews from different perspectives. What does the
a code of communication, transmits the social messages of the
underlying ideology. The structure as well as the content of this code
has been shaped and is constantly being reshaped by it.
Hopefully, to look at law from the novel vantage point of
communication will be illuminating for the jurisprude and helpful
to those who have ventured into the new field of studying the legal
use of computers. Unfortunately Computers and the Law has itself
become a ghetto where a handful of experts are working on techniques
of legal retrieval. No wonder that in an era of money-making
technology the wider questions tend to be ignored.
I am confident that if we are willing to pursue this new approach
and do the necessary spade work, we will strike pay dirt. By looking
at law from the perspective of communication, we can explore its
links with another region which has been hidden by the prevailing
essentialist cults. The topical question of the legal use of computers
will also appear in a new light. If law is not merely a given system
of rules and principles but also a means of communication, then
it will be adaptable to computers where these are useful instead of
remaining inflexible come what may. The real problem is not how
to make computers serve the existing communication system of law,
but how to improve this system with their help. Legislators, judges
and administrators can all play their part to bring that about.
The question is not whether computers should be used for legal
purposes. Computers are here and they are here to stay for the
foreseeable future. We can no more go back to print than we can
return to the oral tradition. One does not have to espouse the inanities
of Marshall McLuhan to appreciate his point that the medium of
print is not an absolute. On the other hand, we must not exaggerate
the benefits computers can confer on the legal process. We only have
to look around to see that the computer revolution is, if anything,
hastening the demise of humanity instead of giving it a new lease
of life. It would be vain to think that the irrationalities which are
built into our ideological systems, of which the legal system is a
part, can be remedied by the use of computers. But since they are
here, we cannot ignore them, and it is as well to know what they
can do and what they can't.
II. Law as a Language of Signs
Communication is made through signs, and in particular through
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language, which is a system of signs for exchanging messages.
student of jurisprudence get in fact? A selection from the established
doctrines, and the false picture that the problem is to decide between
them on rational grounds. The fact that in substance they are on
the same side is consistently ignored. The arguments are over details
and over abstractions which have lost all utility. Once we start off
with the wrong questions, the answers scarcely matter.
I once thought that by reconnecting jurisprudence with philosophy
2
it could be emancipated from its ghetto in the hinterland of law.
Initially the advent of "legal philosophy" certainly helped to introduce
a new perspective, but the end result has been merely to raise new
walls on worked-out philosophical foundations. An approach that
has little to offer on its home ground may still prove fertile in other
fields. Its general insights may shed light in all sorts of unexpected
ways and help to break down the old barriers. Linguistic philosophy
has made some valuable contributions to jurisprudence after it had
ceased to be innovative in its own sphere. But now it is played out;
we need new perspectives to lift jurisprudence out of its present rut.
Law is a complex concept which has many different aspects. To
suggest that a particular perspective is useful is not to claim for it
a monopoly of truth. I was careful to make this point when I put
forward my model of the "legal point of view" which made no
pretence to grasp the essence of law.3 The fact that I shall here
recommend another perspective and venture out in a new direction
does not invalidate what I said before; it merely indicates its limits.
By pointing out that law is also a system of communication I am
not abandoning the "legal point of view" which is concerned with
a mode of institutional social control through the effective application
of a norm-system by the courts.4 Nor am I thereby denying the
conventional link between law and justice, though I would now stress
its ideological nature.5 Law by serving the legal point of view as
2. R. A. Samek, The Legal Point of View, New York, Philosophical Library, 1974,
p. XV.
3. Supra fn 2, p. 86.
4. Supra fn 2, pp. 87-88.

5. R. A. Samek, Justice as Ideology: Another Look at Rawls, (1981), 59 U. of
T.L.J. 787, p. 810. It is important to distinguish between two meanings of "ideology".
According to the first, it denotes what Marxists describe as the "false consciousness"
of the superstructure of a society which includes its political and legal system.
According to the second, it stands for the basic ideas which lie at the foundation,
without any judgment as to their objective validity. I shall use "ideology" here in
the second sense. See ibid, p. 387.
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Language is the medium, not the message. A message is a signal
sent through the signs of language. No sign can stand on its own
feet; it is part of a language of communication and derives its meaning
from it. Even body signs are part of a language, and not discrete
entities.
The famous 19th century French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure
pointed out the arbitrary nature of signs. There is no intrinsic
connection between what he calls the "signifier" and the "signified"
which together constitute the sign. 6 A table happens to be signified
by the sound (and the letters) of "table", but it might have been
signified by "lam", which is not to say that there are not historical
(as distinguished from logical) reasons why the signifier is called
"table" rather than "lam". Language for Saussure as for the latter
Wittgenstein is not a collection of names that denotes separate objects
but a rule-governed working system in virtue of which certain
signifiers are used. Particular words only make sense as part of a
language, and not the other way round. It is interesting to note that
already Bentham took this line, and that he pointed out the
dependence of individual laws on the complete legal system of which
7
they formed part.

Saussure draws a crucial distinction between "langue" and
"'parole"Langue is the conventional system of communication which
underlies and is activated by the speech acts of parole. In a natural
language, langue and parole are organically linked. In Wittgenstein's
terms, a language-game 8 is played by triggering the potential of langue
with the speech acts of parole.9 The speaker uses the prescribed sounds
in the prescribed manner in order to communicate messages to the
recipient.
Written verbalization is still parole; it fulfils the same role as speech
acts by drawing on the code of the language through which the
message is sent. The distinction between phonetics and phonology
illustrates the difference between langue and parole: the former is
6. F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, transl. W. Baskin, London, Peter
Owen, 1960. For an introduction to his work, see J.Culler, Saussure, London,
Harvester Press, 1973.
7. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed.
S. H. Bums and H. L. A. Hart, London, Athlone Press, 1970, p. 301.
8. A "language game" consists of language and the actions into which it is woven.
Wittgenstein, supra fn 1, section 7. See also Samek, supra fn. 2, p. 5.
9. This distinction is by no means free from difficulties. See Culler, supra fn 6,
p. 30.
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concerned with the sounds of speech acts, while the latter is concerned
with the logical distinctions in the meanings of the sounds so made.
For instance, the addition of an "s" sound may change the singular
of a word to plural.
Langue is not so much the technical grammar of a language as
its logical or deep grammar which is harnessed by the speaker to
communicate information. A message is sent by a speech act of parole
in the appropriate form of langue which provides the code for its
transmission. The message is assembled by a combination of signs
which excludes other signs. Take the speech act "The table is in
the room". The receiver will learn from it, inter alia, that there is
one object -

not two, and not a person -

in an enclosed part

of a house, which has usually four legs and a top and can be used
for eating or writing. The "information content" of the message is
the difference between what the receiver knew before and after the
message. The phonetics of the speech act are "arbitrary" in the sense
of being logically independent of the meaning transmitted by them.
Applying Saussure's distinction to law, we may say that its langue
consists of the code of legal conceptual schemes, 10 and its parole
of legal speech acts. The code of legal conceptual schemes is built
on criteria of opposition and combination. E.g., the legal speech act
"A is a bailee" refers to the legal conceptual scheme of "Bailment"
and potentially to such other legal conceptual schemes as "Contracts"
and "Torts" which intersect with it. By using the above speech act
the speaker communicates to the receiver a message from which he
will learn, inter alia, that certain goods have been delivered to A
on the condition that he return them, that he must take reasonable
care of them even when he is not paid, that he may keep them
as security for payment but does not have to keep them indefinitely.
Although the paroleof law overlaps with that of ordinary language,
law has its own langue. This is where the lay person makes his
mistake; he assumes all too frequently that because much of the parole
of law sounds ordinary, it refers to the langue of ordinary language.
E.g., if a lawyer says to a client "you should have a will", he speaks
to her in the language of the law and refers to the legal conceptual
scheme of "Testamentary dispositions". The lawyer, we may say,
uses the parole "will" to advise a client in the langue of the pertinent
10. For an account of "legal conceptual schemes", see R. A. Samek, Unjust
Enrichmen4 Quasi-Contractand Restitution: A Study in Organizing Legal Rules,
(1969) 47 Can. Rev. 1, p. 3.
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legal conceptual scheme to sign a document in proper form that will
give effect to his testamentary wishes. But if someone says in
conversation to another "you should have a will" this speech act
may refer to the much vaguer legalese "making a will" in ordinary
language, or to "volition", "you should have a will of your own".
Legal presupposes ordinary language at every turn; it simply could
not be understood without it. However, a distinction must be made
between the ordinary and the specialized use of a natural language.
When a person speaks as a specialist from the point of view of his
specialized field of interest, his langue is "bent" or slanted by that
point of view." E.g., if a lawyer states that someone has "possession"
of a chattel, he uses this term to communicate a message which differs
from that normally sent by this sign. The difference is not merely
in the meaning of the term; it is in the language of communication
that is being used. A sign has no independent meaning apart from
the code to which it belongs. The meaning of ordinary words or
concepts are determined by their use in the ordinary language code;
the meaning of legal words or concepts are determined by their use
in the legal code. Not only does the langue of law have its own
code; it presupposes the operation of an institutional system of which
it is an integral part.
Since law is a language of signs, it must communicate through
it something other than itself. The content of the message differs from
the code through which it is sent. Compare "the table is in the room"
with "A is bound to sell Blackacre to B". In the first example the
speaker informs the receiver that something is the case. The receiver's
information about the world is increased, not his information about
language. In the second problem the receiver of the message is
informed inter alia that certain social, not just legal consequences
will follow if he repudiates his agreement. His information about
what he can and what he can't do with Blackacre is increased, not
his information about property law.
It is of course possible to communicate a second-order message
about the language of a code through the code. I can give information
about the grammar of a language or about the structure of the legal
system, but this is not the normal object of the exercise. If law is
a language of signs for communicating social messages which serves
the legal point of view, the content of these messages must be social
rather than legal. Even if we look at law in terms of the enforcement
11. Samek, supra fn 2, p. 38.
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of certain norms by the courts without treating it as a system of
communication, the content of these norms must be something other
than law; it must be social, not legal.
Law is "secondary" not in the narrow sense stipulated by Hart
in regard to its secondary rules of recognition, change and
adjudication, 12 but in the sense of being essentially procedural. The
content of legal rules is not law, or the system would turn on itself.
A law which provides legal procedures solely for its own enforcement
has lost sight of its social function. From the legal point of view
the specific social content of legal rules is irrelevant whether we think
of law as a system of sanctions or of communication. We may say,
that law is neutral in the sense that it provides a code for transmitting
social messages regardless of their specific content, though this will
be determined by the prevailing ideology.
There is another way in which law is "secondary". If we look
at law as a social practice, it presupposes a lower level practice which
is regulated by it. E.g., criminal law presupposes a criminal practice
which has as its object to control.'3 By analogy, a system of
communication presupposes a lower level social practice which
generates information that has to be communicated.
III. Communication through Computers
If law is regarded as a language of signs for communicating social
messages, the role of computers will be merely an element in the
communication process in which law is involved. This means that
there is nothing sacrosanct about the existing legal code of
communication. The crucial question is "what can be done to enhance
the effectiveness of the legal code through the use of computers?"
Efficiency obviously has an important economic aspect. An expensive
computer might do a great deal for the speed and precision of handling
legal information, but it would be useless for lawyers who could
not afford to employ it.
The operation of the digital computer, that is one which works
with numbers (digits), can be explained initially by analogy to a
telecommunication channel. There is an input of information which
is coded, transmitted and decoded for output. The code must be
fundamentally simple, or it could not be handled effectively by a
12. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon, 1961, Chapter V.
13. R. A. Samek, Case for Social Law Reform (1977) 55 Can. Bar Rev. 409,
p. 413.
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machine.
The Morse code is often used as a convenient starting point. It
has an alphabet of only two elements -

dots and dashes -

which

can be translated into a binary code of 1 and 0 without difficulty.
All we need to say is that "1" means "current on" and "0" means
"current off". Electrical pulses can be used to transmit messages by
encoding letters, numbers, punctuation marks, parentheses, and
instructions to the computer, e.g., in a "five bit" code. A "bit" is
a unit composed of the symbols 1 (on) and 0 (off) which may be
grouped in numbers of five, 00001, 00010, etc. Unlike morse taps,
electronic pulses will not be sent sequentially but contemporaneously
15
over five or more channels, one for each number of the code.
The function of the digital computer is not merely to communicate
messages coded for speed and precision, but to operate certain
"programmes" which are fed into its data base. Nevertheless, the
resulting computations and problem solutions still have to be
communicated if only to the user. It should be noticed that ordinary
language differs from the computer in that regard more in degree
than in kind. If it could not carry out information processing and
problem solving it would have precious little to communicate.
To revert to the mechanics of computer operation, the
"programmes" are known as "software". The "hardware" of a general
purpose (sequential) digital computer consists of the "memory", the
"central processing unit" (CPU), and the "peripheral equipment". The
memory holds the data base and the programmes. The CPU has
two principal parts: the "arithmetic unit", and the "control unit"
which oversees the progress of the stored programme. The peripheral
or I/O (input-output) equipment enables the computer to
16
communicate with the outside world through its terminals.
Originally when a programmer wanted to place an instruction into
his programme, he had to convert it into a code number and then
insert it into the computer's memory. But now he can get the computer
to translate the "assembly" language into its "machine" language by
programming it to do this beforehand. The software made the
machine behave as if its hardware were able to accept directly natural
14. This was invented by the American Samuel Morse in 1837.
15. For an elementary introduction to computers, see R. Lohberg and T. Lutz,
ElectronicBrains, transl. K. T. Dutfield, New York, Sterling, 1965.
16. B. Raphael, The Thinking Computer, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1976,
pp. 6-10.
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language commands in the instructions. Still, each brand and model
of computer had its own special assemblers which was determined
essentially by its underlying hardware.
The next big step forward was the design of programming languages
purely from the point of view of the classes of problems to be solved
without regard for the hardware of any particular computer. For
instance, FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslator) was invented as a
convenient language for scientists and engineers who need to perform
many algebraic calculations; and COBOL (COmmon BusinessOriented Language) for business record-keeping operations.
The remaining problem was how to teach existing computers,
whatever their machine languages might be, to understand these
problem-oriented languages. The appropriate software can make any
general-purpose computer accept any well-defined formal language.
A "compiler" behaves like a very clever assembler; it scans a
programme in the problem-oriented language and translates it into
the desired machine-language programme.1 7
There are limits even to the most sophisticated hardware and
software. No problem can be solved by a computer unless it is well
defined. One advantage of using computers is that it forces people
to clarify their own fuzzy thinking, though often the very nature of
the problem prevents it from being stated in a form clear enough
to be handled by a computer. Problems are rarely solved in the terms
in which they are initially expressed. Instead, it is common to choose
another data domain through which the problem can be represented.
By selecting an appropriate "representation" the original difficulties
can be avoided. If it has been well designed, the solution of the
idealized problem can be translated into a solution of the real one.1 8
IV. Information and Problem Solving
Information is that which is communicated by the source to the
receiver, not the communication itself. The receiver gains information
and now has something, or if we look at the total, more of something
than he had before. This gain is brought about through the medium
of the code in which the information is transmitted. In the context
of telecommunication and computers, information is generally looked
at quantitatively and not qualitatively. What counts is the rate at
which it can be transmitted over a channel, how much can be packed
17. Raphael, supra fn. 16, pp. 14-17.
18. Raphael, supra fn. 16, p. 32.
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in to maximize communication. The value of a neutral unit of
information varies in inverse proportion with the degree to which
it clogs up the communication channel. For instance, in the Morse
code the most frequent letters were given the shortest symbols, so
that the longer ones could be reserved for the units of greater
information, thus utilizing the channel to the maximum.
The following illustration should make clear the relevance of this
perspective to computers. Suppose I am told that there are eight
files in a filing cabinet in one of which is the document I am looking
for, and I want to locate it with the minimum of questions. Clearly
the wrong way would be to ask "Is it in file one, two, three, and
so on?" The most economical method is to divide the files into two
lots, one to four, and four to eight, and to ask "Is it in one or the
other?" The process can then be repeated until the document is found.
This is essentially how a computer operates to get to the required
location in its memory as quickly as possible. The choice is really
made on probability; it is assumed that the chances of the right file
being in the first lot is equal to its being in the second, and so on.
The alternatives must be equally likely, or the amount of information
in a message which we are practically sure of getting would be the
same as that in one which is quite unexpected. 9
In the above example, the task was one of selecting the right
information in the smallest number of stages. The information may
also be used not to select but to build a picture. Suppose we are
taking readings on a measuring instrument. The first problem here
is to represent in symbolic form what we believe to be the case.
By means of observation we build up a picture step by step. In this
case what we acquire is descriptive, not selective information. The
procedure which gives us the most descriptive information will be
that which builds up the best and most reliable picture. E.g., a more
powerful microscope gives us more information about what we can
see through it than a less powerful one; it gives us more descriptive
20
(structural) information.
The distinction between descriptive and selective "information
content" is important for the legal use of the computer. Simple
information retrieval has a merely selective information content. The
operator is concerned to select e.g., the right headnote of a case from
19. D. M. MacKay, Information, Mechanism and Meaning, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press,
1969, p. 12.
20. MacKay, suprafn. 19, pp. 12-14.
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the wrong ones in the most efficient manner. But if we rely on the
computer to actually help us solve a legal problem, we require a
descriptive information content to build up a picture of the part of
the legal conceptual scheme in question. Any more sophisticated
programme involves feedback, and interaction between the user and
the computer. In this way information is built up "brick by brick"
with the user at the controls.
It has been said that there are two complementary ways of viewing
any problem-solving task. 21 One is based on recognition in the search
space of something that seems to shout "I'm the answer". Then this
selection must be justified. The other approach is one of derivation.
In this case the solution is derived from a particular representation
of the problem by means of some highly structured procedure, such
as logical or mathematical transformations. Pattern recognition is the
best known example of the first approach. Computers are used to
recognize patterns of data, such as printed characters or the sound
of spoken words.
So far as the legal use of computers is concerned, the derivation
approach is only useful in the most routine case. The lawyer looks
for recognition of something in the search space that will if not give
him the answer, at least put him on the right track. He will not
normally expect the computer to actually work out a problem for
him from a to z. Having found a prima facie solution he will want
to test its validity against other alternatives by feedback of selected
areas of the data base. We must not make the mistake of taking
subsequent legal justification for the reasoning process which results
in the solution. Whatever the processes of reasoning and of justifying
may be, they are rarely identical.
The lawyer's crude pattern recognition, aided by computerized
browsing of the search space, is very different from the highly
technical field of scientific or statistical pattern research. Not only
is it difficult to specify patterns of legal doctrine; such patterns leave
out of account the often determinant policy considerations and
apparent vagaries of judicial behaviour. Particularly in regard to the
latter, statistical pattern recognition may prove invaluable, though
it should be noticed that a judge's behaviour may shift with a change
in individual or collective circumstances.

21. Raphael, supra fn. 16, p. 98.
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V. Legal Classification
To classify is usually to assign a new sample to a known class or
category under an established system of classification. There are
innumerable systems of classification, and an infinite number of things
that can be classified. In first order legal classification fact samples
are assigned to legal categories through the code of legal conceptual
schemes. The classification is "decisional", not mechanical; in many
cases a sample may be assigned to more than one category. In second
order legal classification samples of legal categories are assigned to
higher legal categories, e.g., the categories of "offer and acceptance"
are assigned to the higher category of "formation of contract".
"Classification by example" is not limited to law. Scientific
categories, for instance, may be established in this way rather than
by relying on an objective characteristic of a sample that puts it
clearly into one category or another. A sample may not quite fit
any of the established categories. A scientist then must decide whether
to force it into the system by picking on the closest known category,
or changing the system by creating a new one. If he is too willing
to add to the categories, then the system will lose much of its
descriptive value; if, on the other hand, he is to conservative then
the system will be too rigid. Another complication is that any basic
change may have ramifications throughout the system and previous
22
classifications of samples may have to be revised.
2
3
The doctrine of ratiodecidendi is based on reasoning by example.
Since precise boundaries between legal categories cannot be drawn,
it is not possible to assign a new sample to one category rather than
to another merely by analysing competing examples. Similarly, the
new sample cannot be subsumed without a decision under one
prototype rather than under another. To these difficulties must be
added the multi-dimensional nature of legal problems. Even from
the legal point of view, fact situations may raise several issues and
may be subsumed under several legal categories either within one
legal conceptual scheme or several. E.g., a sample fact situation may
be assigned to "offer and acceptance" or "consideration" in Contracts;
to "misrepresentation" in Contracts or Torts; or to "mistake" or
"unconscionability" in Contracts or Restitution.
22. Raphael, supra fn. 16, p. 100.
23. For a critique of this doctrine, see R. A. Samek, The Dynamic Model of the
Judicial Process and the Ratio Decidendi of A Case, (1964) 42 Can. Bar Rev.

433.
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The plaintiff cannot bring several actions on the same cause, but
he can plead in the alternative: e.g., if not Contracts, then Torts;
and if not Contracts and Torts, then Restitution. Moreover, if, as
I have suggested, we adopt the "synthetic approach" and give weight
to the different perspectives which lie behind the different legal
conceptual schemes, a fact situation may be classified as one that
involves Contracts, Torts and Restitution. On this approach the case
is disposed of by calling on the resources of all these conceptual
schemes to contribute in various degrees to the solution. I have
claimed that the synthetic approach is in fact followed informally
by many judges. 24
If we look at law as a system of communication, the problem
of classifying may be described as one of translating ordinary language
statements about facts into the legal code. The lawyer may be
compared to an assembler who translates natural language into
machine language so that it can be processed, only here the processing
language is law. Once the lawyer grasps that he is using a code
when he does his stuff, a further reprocessing through an auxilliary
electronic code should not frighten him off. The only question is
how easily such a code is accessible technically and economically.
For legal communication to be successful the message must be
retranslated into ordinary language and describe the social
consequences of the legal result. A legal solution is worthless unless
it can be understood by the client it must reach. Similarly, a computer
must ultimately serve the consumer who employs it. Of course, I
have been oversimplifying. Legal language is used for many purposes
and to communicate many different things; in Karl Llewellyn's words,
there are many "law jobs" to be done. A lawyer who appeals a
case may only be interested in a point of law, and so may the judge.
Ultimately, however, the legal code must communicate social
messages if law is to be a social system of communication.
VI. ArtificialIntelligence
The "artificial intelligence" of machines is contrasted with the natural
intelligence of persons. At the same time contradictory claims are
made about the capacity of machines to simulate human intelligence.
On the one hand computers are dismissed as mere tools of man,
24. R. A. Samek, The Synthetic Approach and Unjustifiable Enrichment (1977)
27 U. of T.L.J. 335.
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while on the other hand man himself is turned into a machine that
differs little in principle from high powered computers. As to the
first claim, the computer is of course a tool in the wide sense of
having been created by man; computers are not yet born.2 But it
does not follow from this that computers are simple mechanical tools
which can only deliver that which has been fed into them.
In an age of increasingly sophisticated electronic machines with
multiple feedback devices, the computer can be used not merely to
store and process information, but to learn from its "mistakes" within
the framework of an overall programme which it is itself filling out.
Far from being conscious of every move that the computer makes,
the user is often relying on it to spare him the trouble of getting
involved in the details of the operation. A computer's central memory
may be deliberately shielded from overload by auxiliary storage
systems which can be tapped automatically when the need arises,
and whole subroutines may be developed which remain independent
of the computer's central programmes.
Looking at the other side of the coin, there is a limit to what
can be done by the most sophisticated computer. This is not merely
so by virtue of the impossibility in many cases of working out effective
procedures or algorithms as they are called. After all, what constitutes
an effective procedure will vary from case to case, especially in
interactive programmes which enable the operator and the machine
to increase each other's effectiveness. Kurt Godel has shown that
no formal system can ever be complete in itself. 26 Man is primordial.
He may create a computer that will destroy him, but it will remain
dependent on his programmer. Natural intelligence can never be
reduced to machine language, for the language of instruction cannot
be reduced to the language from which it is constructed.
The fact that human beings may be regarded as neuron,
homeostatic or other systems does not turn them into machines. If
they are "machines", then they are of a different order with senses,
emotions, memory and language so finely tuned that no artificial
intelligence can take their place. Above all, the irreducible "feel"
of human existence cannot be duplicated by any feedback device,

25. But they will be when genetic engineering computer-designs embryos. God help
US.
26. See, e.g., J. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason, San Francisco,
W. H. Freeman, 1976, p. 221.
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and is far too "vague" to be within reach of any effective computer
procedures.
The transcendent nature of man is reflected in the transcendent
claims made for law. As long as law wears the mantle of justice,
it cannot be locked into a computable set of rules, or predictions
about judicial behaviour. Both these perspectives are useful as means
but harmful as ends. 27 The intuitive hunch of a good lawyer can
never be embodied in a computer programme, but it can in many
cases be exercised more effectively with its help. The formal aspect
of law is merely the tip of a social iceberg. Hence to simulate "legal"
decisions requires more than a legal data base. The complexities of
using computers to arrive at correct doctrinal decisions pale before
the task of computing the underlying social considerations. Again
this is not to say that the computer is useless for this purpose. Artificial
intelligence can greatly enhance natural intelligence as long as it is
not misused to replace it.
VII. Teaching the Computer How to Learn
All learning can be said to be by feedback, that is by profiting from
the result of past experience. Computer-learning may be either selflearning through a programmed learning system, or learning
interactively through dialogue with the user. In neither case do we
use the computer merely to retrieve some information in a given
memory space; we utilize its memory through feedback to achieve
a desired result. The user relies on the computer to find the best
technique for realizing it. We can draw an analogy here with an
automatic guided weapons system. The computer works out the
trajectory under the guidance of a general programme to find the
target.
Simply transferring data into a memory so that it can be retrieved
if required, such as entering a list of names of employees, salaries,
and addresses, involves minimum feedback and learning. Updating
such a list is more demanding and could be described as goal-directed.
The goal would be to keep files up-to-date by comparing the new
data with the old and changing them where necessary. But unless
the computer is given a free-hand to develop its own method for
27. The human propensity is to displace concerns about ends with concerns about
means. See R. A. Samek, The Meta Phenomenon, New York, Philosophical Library,
1981.
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bringing about this goal, we are telling it what to do, and not how
to learn from doing its job. The name of the game is trial and error.
The computer puts its "mistakes" to use for perfecting its search
techniques, not just to terminate the search.
There is a good deal of middle ground between regarding the
computer as a mechanism for primitive information retrieval and
believing that it can replace the human user. At present far too much
emphasis is placed on its immediate cash value to the practitioner,
though this is understandable seeing that he pays the lion's share
of the bill. Once we recognize its enormous value for legal scholarship,
the present state of the art will be perceived merely to scratch the
surface of its potential. We are still looking at computer use through
the wrong end of the telescope. Its real challenge is not to mechanize
manual research; it is to re-examine the very ground on which we
stand. For instance, by getting the computer to analyse statistically
different elements of the judicial process, new light will be shed on
the relationship between doctrine and judicial behaviour.
The suppression of the crucial part of ideological values in judicial
decision making hides its real nature. What is truly frightening is
not so much the use of the computer for making legal decisions
as limiting it to a restricted legal data base. The legal and other
uses of the computer are not mutually exclusive. The problem is
not to teach the computer to "think like a lawyer," that is to reduce
social to legal phenomena and solutions, but to reverse that process.
I have suggested that law is a system of communication. This does
not mean that we should accept its signals uncritically. Like any
language, law carries the messages which are in keeping with the
society it serves. Although the lawyer is dealing in social values, he
perceives his role through the distorting mirror of the prevailing
ideology. The seeming autonomy of the legal point of view exemplifies
this truth. By enlarging the computer's data base we can help to
lift the legal veil. On the other hand, it would be absurd to look
to the computer for changing the social content of the communication
system of law. As is only too evident, it too is the servant of the
ideology which has created it. The most we can hope for is that
the informational revolution will prove so radical that it will break
its own chains.
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VIII. QUIC/LA W, WESTLA W andLEXIS2 8
There are two main electronic legal retrieval systems in use in North
America, the Canadian QUIC/LAW (QL/Search) on which the U.S.
WESTLAW was built, and the U.S. LEXIS system. All use digital
computers to search their data banks for words, phrases and numbers.
QL Systems was incorporated in 1973 to carry forward work
commenced by the QUIC/LAW project at Queen's University. Since
then, it has developed the first Canadian commercial information
retrieval system. Its data base contains the full text of federal and
some provincial Canadian statutes, the headnotes of the Supreme
Court of Canada and Federal Court Reports plus those of some
provincial reports, and other materials. The system may be entered
by questions in ordinary language and by key words and phrases.
WESTLAW has a much larger data base, and its Full Text Plus
system now contains the full text of statutes and cases as well as
an indexed system of headnotes and synopses. The introduction of
the new system deprived LEXIS of its main advantage as the only
full text system of cases in North America. Now it is left with the
disadvantages of not having an indexed system of cases. Each
headnote in WESTLAW is classified under the West's system of
Digest Topics and Key Numbers. You can use the Digest Topic and
Key Numbers as part of your search request. This, WESTLAW
claims, is important when there are many alternative expressions for
a particular term, or when you want to exclude certain legal subjects
from your search.
The headnotes in WESTLAW have a uniform style for citing
statutes and courts' rules as compared to the full text of decisions
which use different citation styles. By using the appropriate citation
you will retrieve all relevant cases that construe a statute or court
rule. You can also evaluate cases faster because the synopsis at the
beginning of each case gives you a concise overview of the decision.
WESTLAW assigns a relevance value to each headnote by
computing how closely it matches the search request in word usage
and frequency, and then displays each in order of relevance. But
it should be noted that this relevance is verbal and not conceptual,
with the result that frequently conceptually irrelevant headnotes are
listed first. In both systems searches for cases may be made by the
28. I would like to acknowledge gratefully the information made available to me

by the companies concerned.
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name of the case, or by the name of a party or of a judge, and
the search may be limited by the level of the court, by the state
and by a date or range of dates. In both systems the search space
may be restricted by patterns of key words. In WESTLAW this is
defined by sentence or paragraph only. LEXIS offers the KWIC (Key
Word in Context) format under which the search words appear in
a window with about twenty-five words on each side. Both systems
provide instant citation services, including past and future cites of
the search case, comprehensive cites of statutes and regulations,
parallel cites and cite verifications, and Shephard's citations.
This is not the place to compare the above systems in any detail,
but short of proving that WESTLAWs indexing is useless or
uneconomic it must give that system the cutting edge. The issue is
no longer whether an indexed or a full text system is better. No
index is fool proof. What is more, it narrows the ambit of its search
to its scheme. Not only does it impose a particular structure on legal
phenomena; it promotes a legalistic view of the judicial process.
No good judge stays within the framework of legal classifications
even though he uses it to justify his decision. A full text system has
the advantage of tracing factual connections which escape a legal
index. Take LEXIS' example of "leaving an ignition key in an
unattended boat". Such patterns may prove valuable in a search
independently of the legal concepts and principles involved. Fact
pattern searches are not only, as LEXIS claims, particularly useful
in areas of law where principles are well defined and cases are decided
on nuances of fact; they are also useful in the converse case where
the principles are so ill defined that the facts cry out for classification.
LEXIS' claim that hierarchically organized indices are ill-suited
for finding cases involving two or more fields of law, e.g., Tax and
Contracts, requires further elaboration. Certainly valuable time can
be saved if we can retrieve the precise precedents in a well defined
boundary area by embarking on a search of a combination of these
words in a text. But this search may in practice turn up more irrelevant
cases than an index. Moreover, the very choice of such search words
as "Tax" and "Contracts" presupposes an index of legal classification
without which even the most precise precedent could not be
interpreted.
It is of course true that the search words may not be in the index
because of its structure or because equivalent words have been used.
But the converse may also be true; these words may not be in the
full text either. The question is not whether an indexed system is
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adequate, but whether a full text system is so. I suggest that it is
not. Whatever we may think of legal classifications, we cannot ignore
them. Valuable and cathartic as American Realism was, it did not
recognize the communication function of law and threw the baby
out with the bathwater.
Saussure's distinction between parole and langue can be used to
demonstrate the need for a legal index. I have said that the langue
of law consists of the code of legal conceptual schemes, and the
parole of its speech acts. We cannot remain on the phonetic level
of words because on that level they are not signs for anything. The
advantage of an index is that its keys provide an established route
to the legal code and its authoritative sources, though not necessarily
at the first go to the right part. This is why an interactive system
is so important. It enables us to select in a dialogue with the computer
the relevant part(s) of the legal conceptual scheme(s) and of their
source materials.
Initially the connection between the facts and the legal code can
be made through technical words like "detinue" or semi-technical
words like "trespass", or through apparently ordinary descriptive
words such as "handicapped". Sooner or later a merely descriptive
link must be translated into legal language. Even if the appropriate
part(s) of the governing legal conceptual scheme is reached by
ordinary search words, it cannot be "milked" except in the proper
legal way.
In some cases it may be easier to locate the relevant part of a
legal conceptual scheme and its source materials by a descriptive
expression. For instance, in a problem involving a "seeing-eye dog"
it may be quicker to search under that expression than to look at
a legal index under "human rights" and "blind". But a good index
should contain this expression under "blind". Conversely, if we have
to search the full text of statutes and cases for "seeing-eye dog",
this will sooner or later take us into human rights legislation. We
must use the legal code to get its benefit.
A full text system can never take the place of an index. It is no
use having maximum recall of the occurrence of certain words or
phrases at the price of a maximum retrieval of irrelevant material.
As I have stressed, we are not merely concerned with the parole
of these words and phrases, but with their value as signs in the langue.
Since there is always more than one parole route to these signs, there
is nothing to assure us that the search words and phrases are precisely
those which have been used by all judges and legislators in referring
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to the langue of the legal conceptual schemes. Short of having a
thesaurus of synonyms and antonyms, generalizations and
particularizations, and grammatical and orthographical variations, we
cannot put our trust in a full text system. 29 The criticism that any
indexed system has gaps is balanced by the equally cogent objection
that this is true of full text systems as well.
To sum up, an indexed system has the advantage of providing
us with a shortcut to the desired part of the legal code and its source
materials. It does seem rather senseless to shut our eyes to its existence
and then to try and get inside it through verbal mechanics. In terms
of Saussure's distinction, it is like trying to understand parole by
ignoring its connection with langue. Since no index system is perfect,
a full text back-up system is certainly useful, but this is no reason
for not putting first things first. WESTLAW's criticism of a merely
full text retrieval system does not go to the heart of the matter. The
crucial trouble with an unindexed system is not that descriptive search
words may not connect up with legal materials, but that unless we
use them as signifiers in relation to a legal index, they cannot fulfill
their functions as signs of a code.
It does not follow from what I have said that an indexed system
is adequate for predicting the outcome of legal decisions. Judges,
as I have already indicated, do not act on doctrine alone. The
American realists were right in criticizing the singular naivet& of that
view. But we must not go to the opposite extreme and dismiss all
doctrine as worthless. As things are, counsel will still have to argue
his case largely in terms of conceptual schemes, and judges will have
tojustify their decision with reference to the authorities. Hence, though
we may suspect the large claims made for the legal code, we cannot
afford to do without it; and if the computer can help us in that
regard, so much the better.
IX. Electronic v. Manual Retrieval Systems
Electronic retrieval systems have four main advantages: speed,
precision, convenience and economy. Obviously, not any system, let
alone the most expensive one, will be rewarding for any lawyer.
In a capitalist system the economic factor is paramount in practice.
We must look at the total budget of a law office in terms of its
29. C. Tapper, Legal Information Retrieval by Computer: Applications and
Implications,(1974) 20 McGill L. J. 26, p. 33.
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human and material resources, and then undertake a cost benefit
analysis which will include the cost benefit of automated management
and retrieval services. Computers must not be treated in opposition
to manual search, and the costs of legal retrieval must not be
calculated in isolation from the other expenditures.
The old DATUM system developed by the University of Montreal
between 1963 and 1973 relied on a "service centre" instead of
installing a computer in the user's office. 30 This carried out
comprehensive research which was not limited to automated retrieval.
In some cases it will be advantageous to contract out research,
particularly for small firms which lack the necessary resources or
skill or volume to do it economically themselves. Even large firms
which are linked to a computer may find it economic to rely on
service centres for certain parts of their work. For these reasons the
question whether or not electronic research should be done by
specialized service centres or by private firms is misleading. Similarly,
what personnel in a firm should use the computer will depend on
the circumstances and the kind of retrieval that is conducted. With
the simplification of assembly languages the actual physical training
will become less and less onerous. On the other hand, computer
assisted legal retrieval will always demand some skills that must be
acquired in practice.
The present trend is very much in favour of computerization since
each year the relative cost of computers is decreasing. But this
does not mean that we should merely mechanize the old manual
techniques. We do not construct a modern rail system by modelling
it on the horse and buggy, and when we use a plane we expect
to fly to our destination, not to roll there on the ground. Just as
there is no one transportation system so there is no one
communication system which is best. "Best" must always be limited
to what is best for the purpose in hand, given the available resources.
To fly a short distance may be more trouble and expense than it
is worth. It goes without saying that there is no reason for confining
oneself to any one system, except on purely economic grounds. Surely
the best system in many cases will be a mixture of what is available.

30. C. Fabien, ComputerizedLegal Research in Canada, working paper, Automated
Legal Research, 1979, p. 2.
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X. Simulating Lawyers' Reasoning
In a plea for interdisciplinary work between lawyers and computer
scientists, B. G. Buchanan and T. E. Headrick remark that legal
3
information retrieval has been hampered by two misconceptions. '
Lawyers have viewed the computer as at most a storehouse from
which cases and statutes might be retrieved by well designed indexing
systems. Computer scientists, on the other hand, have viewed law
as a collection of facts and correct legal principles, and assumed the
computer to be most helpful when it could retrieve the right answer
quickly. But the lawyer, the authors state, hardly ever looks for clear
answers: more often than not he constructs legally acceptable
arguments in the pursuit of objectives. Interdisciplinary research could
lead both to a greater understanding of the legal reasoning process
and to the design of machine methods for performing parts of it.
After mentioning the difficulties of turning simple key-word
searching into sophisticated natural language communication, the
authors stress the need to break down intuitive legal reasoning into
clear sets of sub-problems. This is bound to prove unsettling for the
lawyer who will be aware of the gap between what he wants to
say and what the rigourous demands of machine language will let
him say. Even after one machine-readable representation has been
found for a class of problems, this will not necessarily be the best
for all of them. The lawyer must be prepared to experiment with
alternative representations.
The authors distinguish between two models of creative legal
research, though they admit that so little is known about the process
that they are necessarily oversimplified and incomplete. In the first
model, the fact situation has been set and the client wants to know
what his remedies and risks are. In the second model, a client is
planning a future action and can control the chain of events to some
extent. His objective is not merely a favourable legal result, but a
32
combination of legal, business and other goals.
The existing retrieval systems, Buchannan and Headrick contend,
help only on the periphery of the processes described in both models.
They retrieve cases and statutes that are potentially relevant. Ideally
the lawyer would not want from the computer mere lists of statutory
provisions and cases related to legal concepts that may help him
31. B. C. Buchanan and T. E. Headrick, Some Speculation aboutArtificialIntelligence
and Legal Reasoning.(1970-71) 23 Stan. L. Rev. 40.
32. Buchanan and Headrick, supra fn. 31, p. 47.
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put together an argument or design a new search. He would want
a system that would produce legal arguments - the end products
of his search. To begin designing such a system, the authors say,
we have to know more about the mental processes of a lawyer. Only
then can we begin to structure the processes a computer could imitate.
According to Buchanan and Headrick, the lawyer first establishes
and pursues a goal: he seeks some satisfactory legal result for his
client. There are some crucial steps in this process: one is his
perception of linkages, of how a set of facts calls into play a rule,
which then calls into play another rule. Another is his decision about
whether an indicated legal result is compatible with his goal. If it
is incompatible, he will reject the rule by distinguishing the facts,
and choose one that will serve his goal better.
It should be noted that what the authors have in mind when they
speak of the lawyer's first mental step in terms of realizing a
satisfactory "legal" result is one that produces the social consequences
best suited to his client's case. Similarly, when they describe the
lawyer's second mental step as a process of fact recognition and
characterization, they emphasize that the "facts" are interpreted
adversarily and that there is no uniform way of recording them.
By the same token, the authors point out that the lawyer's third
mental step of rule selection from the facts is result-oriented, and
that more than one rule may be chosen from the same facts. Finally,
they make a similar point about the lawyer's fourth mental step of
33
drawing analogies through the generalization of a legal rule.
In view of the authors' admission that none of these steps is clearcut, it is surprising to find them so sanguine about applying a scientific
computer programme to them. In the absence of efficient procedures,
it is hard to see how such a programme can possibly work. This
is presumably what W. E. Boyd means when he states that legal
data are not as easily labelled as scientific ones.M He also questions
Buchanan's and Headrick's assumption that "lawyering" is essentially
a search for controlling legal rules. Referring to Edward Levi, Boyd
claims, that it is that which underlies the rules at a given point in
time, and not the rules themselves that is important.3 Although
Buchanan and Headrick acknowledge that analogies are an essential
33. Buchanan and Headrick, supra fn. 31, pp. 51-52.
34. W. E. Boyd, Law in Computers and Computers in Law, (1972) 14 Ar. L.R.
267, pp. 283-284.
35. Boyd, supra fn. 34, p. 285.
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element of legal reasoning, they fail, Boyd says, to acknowledge that
they are at the heart of the judicial process. Unhappily, he comments,
analogy is probably the least developed area of artificial intelligence.
XI. Normalized Language and the ABF Computer
I have already referred to the difficulty of making the computer
understand ordinary language. Every computer programme must be
clear and definite; shades of meaning, background through open
contexts, emotive over or undertones, and vague metaphors cannot
be adequately conveyed in machine language. Natural language
assemblers are restricted to those parts of ordinary language which
can be computerized, and that is a much more severe restriction than
merely resolving ambiguities, and the problems created by synonyms,
antonyms and the syntactical ordering of sentences. All these can
be attended to provided that we limit the context to one which the
computer can handle. Even for the simplest forms of retrieval, some
formalization of the input is required.
Layman E. Allen has proposed a "normalized" language for the
36
drafting of statutes, regulations, contracts and other legal documents.
As he makes clear, such normalization is necessary not merely for
the use of computers, but to simplify and standardize communication
through legal documents. Normalization results in documents that
are easier to understand in the dual sense that they can be read faster
and more accurately than ordinary ones.
Allen's normalization is concerned with syntax, not semantics.
Semantics, as used by him, refers to how the meaning of the overall
sentence is influenced by the meaning given to individual words and
phrases. Syntax refers to how the meaning of the overall sentence
is influenced by interpreting words that express semantic relationships.
For instance, in the sentence "persons who are doctors and lawyers
qualify", "persons", "doctors","lawyers", and "qualify" are semantic
words, while the word "and" is syntactic. Whether a psychologist
with a Ph. D. is a doctor for the purpose of this sentence is a semantic
question; whether a person who is a doctor but not a lawyer qualifies
as a syntactic question.
I. A. Sprowl with Layman Allen's assistance developed formalized
language into a new kind of computer programme and processor
36. Layman E. Allen and C. Rudy Engholm, Normalized Legal Drafting and the
Query Method (1977-78) 29 J.L.E. 380.
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called "ABF", named after the American Bar Foundation by which
it was sponsored. 37 The central idea was to draft computational
procedures from statutes and regulations. Statutes drafted in Allen's
normalized language are typically set forth within the syntax "If...
and... then.. ." rather than as general rules followed by exceptions,
exceptions to exceptions, and cross-references to other rules. For
example, section 65 of the Uniform Sales Act (1979) reads:
Where the goods have not been delivered to the buyer, and the
buyer has repudiated the contract to sell or sale, or has manifested
his inability to perform his obligations thereupon, or has committed
a material breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract
or the sale by giving notice of his election to do so to the buyer.
Allen suggests rewriting this statute in normalized form as follows:
IF
the goods have not been delivered to the buyer,
AND
the buyer has repudiated the contract to sell or sale
OR
the buyer has manifested an inability to perform his
obligations under the contract to sell or sale,
AND
the seller gives notice of his election to rescind to the buyer,
THEN
38
the seller may totally rescind the contract or sale.
Allen's normalized language for statute drafting resembles a
conventional computer-programming language in so far as all
standard programming languages assign precise meanings to words
such as "and," "or," "not," and "then". The close similarity of Allen's
normalized language to a conventional programming language lead
Sprowl to design a processor that can be "programmed" by feeding
into it normalized statutes and regulations. A specialist in an area
of law, he says, can thereby create within it a normalized "image"
of the law relating to his or her specialty. Such a processor can direct
an attorney's attention to the critical issues by asking questions derived
from the normalized statutes. The processor can accept the answers
supplied by the attorney and display the conclusions that necessarily
37. J. A. Sprowl, Automating the Legal Reasoning Process:A Computer that Uses
Regulations and Statutes to Draft Legal Documents, (1979) A.B.F.R.J. 1.
38. Sprowl, supra fn. 37, p. 11.
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follow from them. An important advantage of the ABF processor,
Sprowl claims, is that it links a small group of specialists to a large
group of generalists who lack both the specialized legal and the
computational skills to undertake the search themselves.
Take the normalized version of s. 65 of the Uniform Sales Act.
In the above procedure, Sprowl says, the words "if", "and", "or",
"then", and "not" are operator words which the ABF processor fully
understands. The remaining words are space holders for propositions
that may be either true or false. The processor scans the procedure
and recognizes that it is to determine the truth of the proposition
"the seller may totally rescind the contract or sale". Accordingly,
it derives questions from the language of the procedure and displays
them to the attorney. The exact number of questions needed will
depend on the answers supplied.
The first question derived from the above procedure is
Have the goods been delivered to the buyer?
If the attorney types "yes", then no further questions need to be
asked, for the conclusion simply does not follow. If this question
is answered "no", then there is still the possibility that the seller may
be permitted to rescind. Accordingly, the processor next asks:
Has the buyer repudiated the contract to sell or sale?
If this question is answered "yes", it is unnecessary to inquire whether
he has also "manifested his inability to perform". But if the buyer
has not repudiated the contract, then the processor asks.
Has the buyer manifested his ability to perform his obligations
under the contract to sell or sale?
If both of the above two questions are answered "no", then once
again no more questions need to be asked. But if the buyer has either
repudiated the contract or has manifested his inability to perform,
then the processor asks the following final question:
Does the seller give notice of his election to rescind to the buyer?
Only if this question is answered "yes" does the processor conclude
that the seller may totally rescind the contract or sale, and displays
may
this conclusion to the attorney or legal assistant. The processor
39
document.
form
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Without wishing to belittle the ingeniousness of the proposed
procedure, it seems to assume that the questions asked relate to matters
39. Sprowl, supra fn. 37, pp. 36-37.
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of fact, and that if the answers are provided the processor can
automatically churn out the legal conclusion. But none of the
questions are factual in the sense that they can be answered with
the resources of ordinary language. All the questions are asked from
the legal point of view and require this perspective for their answers;
in other words the parole of the words used must be related to the
langue of the legal conceptual scheme of "sale of goods" if the correct
social message is to be transmitted in the answer. "Delivery",
"repudiation", "inability to perform" and "notice of election to
rescind" are all legal code words with very special meanings, and
not merely ordinary language signs.
This difficulty is of course not peculiar to the Uniform Sales Act,
or statute law, or to Sprowl's computational procedure. Once we
recognize that law is a specialized language of communication, it
will be evident that it cannot be reduced to ordinary language simply
by normalizing it. To send the desired social message requires
processing the initial statement of the facts through the langue of
the legal code. This cannot be done at the parole verbal level of
the statute.
There are certainly routine cases in which a computer can be taught
to produce a doctrinal solution. If the case is at all complex, decisions
on how to classify the facts will have to be made. The problem
is not one of ambiguity, but lies in the inherent open texture of legal
conceptual schemes. It cannot be resolved on the level of doctrine;
the search must be extended to the social context of the legally selected
facts and to the underlying ideology of the judicial system. Unless
the computer can be programmed to take account of these factors,
its legal solutions will often prove wrong.
Sprowl makes it clear that he wants the computer to do something
more than retrieve legal conclusions: he wants it to use them to draft
legal documents. 40 His chosen method is to build up the document
step by step by answering the questions asked by the computer on
the basis of the programmed procedures. Sprowl claims that
experience to date indicates that attorneys can be trained to set up
41
and maintain such systems with little or no programmer assistance.
It follows from what I have said that if computer drafting is to
be more than standard processing of facts, all the difficulties of
reaching legal conclusions will beset the drafting procedures. This
40. Sprowl, supra fn. 37, p. 45.
41. Sprowl, supra fn. 37, pp. 80-81.
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is not to deny that the computer may lend itself very well to the
drafting of routine documents, and to the development of interactive
drafting systems which assist a generalist to draft documents which
he could not have done on his own.
XII. Stretching "Taxman"
L. T. McCarty describes his programme TAXMAN as capable of
performing a very rudimentary form of computer-aided legal
reasoning. 42 Given a description of the facts of a corporate
reorganization case, he states, it can analyse them in terms of several
legal concepts. By looking at the adequacy of his formal model in
this particular area of the law. McCarty seeks to throw some light
on the structure and dynamics of legal concepts generally. He claims
that the TAXMAN programme provides a more structured, more
flexible and potentially more powerful alternative to the existing fulltext or key-word retrieval systems and to the question and answer
systems which are designed to terminate in a legal conclusion. The
prevailing retrieval systems generally store the full text of legal
documents and retrieve parts of them by key words or combinations
of key words. Although this can be very useful, it is confined to
looking only at the "surface statistics" of legal language. By contrast,
the extended version of TAXMAN would store a representation of
the underlying conceptual structure of a statute or of a case and
retrieve it by a sophisticated pattern-matching operation. 43
Another approach, McCarty says, is based on computer-aided
instruction (CAI). The computer poses questions designed to elicit
the essential facts of a case, and then suggests a tentative analysis
or poses an additional factual question. Although there are parallels
with TAXMAN, the user faces a series of pre-programmed questions
and usually responds in a strictly multiple-choice format. In the
extended version of TAXMAN, on the other hand, the most important
and difficult work is done at the start, when the description and
analysis mechanisms are designed to capture the basic conceptual
structure of the problem domain. Once this is done, the "analysis"
and "planning" modes of the system can be programmed in a uniform
and systematic way. This permits a much greater flexibility in the

42. L. T. McCarty, Reflexions on TAXMAN. An Experiment in ArtificialIntelligence
andLegal Reasoning, (1977) 90 Harv. L. Rev. 837.
43. McCarty, supra fn. 42, p. 889.
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interactive process, and much less concern about details of the
interaction. In general, then, the TAXMAN approach appears to have
much greater long-range potential than a CAI system."
The most interesting aspect of TAXMAN is its attempt to increase
the efficiency and scope of computer-aid by building an interactive
system with the capacity of moving the problem for analysis or
planning from the lower level of fact-matching to higher levels of
generalization and abstraction. The idea is to reach legal conclusions
by representing in the data base of the computer a library of fact
situations and a hierarchy of legal concepts under which they might
be subsumed. The problem facts will then be matched against
competing conceptual legal patterns to find the best fit.
The suggested method is really an attempt to move from the
ordinary language code in which fact situations are described, to the
specialized code of legal conceptual schemes into which they must
be translated. The translation may be made at different levels of
generality and abstraction. There is not merely one mechanical fit
for each fact situation: both facts and legal concepts may be described
at different levels of generality, and the link will be made by the
computer at the most convenient junction. Where a history of
transactions is involved, state descriptions must be brought up to
date by event descriptions. The input will be first an initial state
description, then a list of chronologically arranged event descriptions,
45
and finally a full sequence of modified state descriptions.
The difficulties lie not so much in representing fact situations and
the appropriate legal concepts in the data base as in programming
the innumerable ways of describing facts and legal concepts, and
their interaction. "Facts" from the legal point of view and according
to the legal code, are by no means the same as ordinary facts. The
management of facts for the purpose of an actual or hypothetical
trial by evidence removes any hard and fast distinction between facts
and law: the law reaches into the facts and colours them in its own
light. Since the law is never static, the facts take on different colours
with the times.
McCarty is aware of some of these difficulties even in the relatively
narrow field of corporate reorganization. He admits that reliance on
the established concepts does not allow for the rise of new legal

44. McCarty, supra fn. 42, pp. 890-891.
45. McCarty, supra fn. 42, p. 866.
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categories, which remain shadowy until they break through the
surface. This is merely another way of saying that no formulation
of legal doctrine can provide an exhaustive set of criteria for solving
a current legal problem. An interactive computer system may be
invaluable in putting us on the right legal track, but it will be even
more so if it can provide us with information about the adequacy
of the current legal concepts. Not only are new legal categories waiting
in the wings; the established ones may be circumvented to give effect
to the perceived equities of the case and the underlying policies of
the controlling statutes or precedents.
According to McCarty, the basic idea of the extended version of
TAXMAN is to develop a data base consisting of (1) a large number
of factual descriptions, taken from reported cases, revenue rulings,
treasury regulation hypotheticals, etc.; (2) a wide variety of legal
concepts and rules taken from the Code, the Regulations, and other
sources; and (3) the set of all possible legal characterizations for each
factual description in the data base in terms of the stored concepts
and rules. The system could then be used simply as a device to retrieve
the fact situations which match certain patterns of interest, or which
satisfy certain aspects of a legal concept or rule. It could also be
used to analyse a new case: the user could describe the new case
to the system and then generate a range of applicable higher-level
concepts. Finally, the system could be used for planning: the user
could describe an initial situation and a desired end result, and then
generate a number of possible transaction patterns with the desired
consequences. 46
There is a "utopian" note in this computerized do-it-all system.
I have stressed that there are limits to what can be made computable,
which requires clear and efficient procedures. Every programmer is
impaled on the horns of a dilemma: either he is content to leave
a gap between artificial and human intelligence, or his programme
will remain vacuous. The computer presupposes a higher level human
programmer just as a computer code presupposes a higher level
natural language. The vision of a computer age which fails to heed
this lesson is far from utopian. Man can delegate tasks requiring
intelligence to the computer, but he cannot delegate his intelligence
without losing it. This is well exemplified by the use of computers
in the law. There is a certain tension between law and technology.
As long as law lays claim to an intrinsic connection with justice,
46. McCarty, supra fn. 42, p. 888.
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it will, in principle at least, transcend the power of any computer.
To reduce it to a set of mechanical rules is to turn it into a bureaucratic
47
machine.
XIII. Conclusion
Law may be regarded as a language of signs for communicating social
messages which serve the legal point of view. Applying Saussure's
distinction between parole and langue to law, we can say that its
langue consists of the code of legal conceptual schemes and its parole
of legal speech acts. The role of computers is merely an element
in the communication process in which law is involved. There is
no reason to confine legal communication to print. Instead of foisting
the computer as an extra on an already outdated system, we should
try with its help to rejuvenate it. The crucial question is not "does
the computer have a legal use?" but "what can be done to enhance
the effectiveness of the legal communication system through the use
of computers?" Similarly, the crucial question is not "are computers
capable of legal reasoning?", but "what can be done effectively with
computers and at what economic cost?"
The role of the computer in law is still too often perceived merely
as an auxiliary means of retrieving legal materials, and the choice
between computer systems is one between full text and indexed
retrieval. The advantage of an index is that it provides us with a
shortcut to the desired part of the legal code and its source materials.
It does not follow from this either that a full text system is not useful
as a back-up, nor that an indexed system is adequate for predicting
the outcome of legal decisions. Judges by and large try to decide
cases on their merits, though these will be judged within the
framework of the controlling precedents with reference to which they
will have to be justified.
The computer can be taught to learn. Computer learning may be
either self-learning through a programmed learning system, or learning
interactively through dialogue with the user. In both cases we utilize
the computer's memory to achieve a desired result with the help
of feedback. There is no reason why a goal-directed search should
not be enhanced by interactive dialogue where this is useful. Not
only can the human agent not be replaced by the computer; in the
field of law at least, it cannot function effectively without him except
47. R. A. Samek, supra fn. 5, p. 810.
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in routine cases.
The fact that human beings can be viewed as neuron or homeostatic
systems does not turn them into machines. If they are "machines",
then they are machines of a different order with senses, emotions,
memory and language so finely tuned that no artificial devices can
take their place. The transcendent nature of man is reflected in the
transcendent claims made for law. As long as law wears the mantle
of justice, it cannot be locked into a computable set of rules, or
predictions about judicial behaviour.

